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THE FUTURE OF FETAL RESEARCH IN
CALIFORNIA: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The rapid rise in medical technology has resulted in the
promulgation of restrictive research regulations at both state
and federal levels. The statutory treatment of fetal research
illustrates the trend to regulate experimentation through
legislation. The California fetal research statute is used as a
model of state legislative efforts. This statute is examined
both for legislative intent and for its effect on the research
community. Alternatives to resolution of the fetal research
controversy at the state level are discussed, followed by a
recommendation for the best solution to this medical-ethical
dilemma.
Science and medicine, like kings, presidents and parliaments must
remain below, but let us hope not immobilized by, law.1
The balance between scientific progress through innovative exper-
iments and the reluctance of the general public to accept shifts in
traditional ethical norms must eventually be resolved within the
American legal system. Chief Justice Warren Burger, in his article on
experimental medicine, predicted that the law with regard to the
"new biology" would emerge slowly through the courts by an appli-
cation of traditional common law precepts.2 Because he concluded
that the evolution of law need not keep pace with scientific devel-
opments, he foresaw no need for rapid legislative action.3 Within a
few years after publication of Chief Justice Burger's article, legis-
lators began to discover that the courts were not quick enough in
dealing with many major bioethical dilemmas. Consequently, a rash
of legislation regulating scientific research emerged at both state4
and federal levels.5 These statutes have caused an effective curtail-
1. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 436, 442 (1968).
2. Id. at 439.
3. Id. at 438.
4. Areas of the "New Biology" now subject to legislation at the state level
include sterilization, fetal experimentation, transplantation, organ donation,
and behavior control. See C. LEvY, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW (1975).
5. Federal regulations, enforced through control of funding or distribution
of drugs, have reached into many areas of human experimentation. For exam-
ple, the Food and Drug Administration regulates pharmacological studies while
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) regulates such areas
as research on the fetus, research on prisoners, and research on pregnant
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ment of research in certain controversial areas due both to conflict-
ing provisions between governmental levels and to ambiguities with-
in the terms of particular statutes.
Fetal research highlights this conflict between science and ethics.
Although physicians have been able to use some of the results of fetal
experimentation to develop treatment for fetal disorders, and the
potential for future benefits is promising, many segments of society
find some or all types of fetal research morally objectionable. State6
and federal 7 legislatures, reluctant to await judicial solutions to
fetal research problems, have enacted regulatory statutes. This
Comment focuses upon California legislation as an illustration of the
difficulties faced by other legislative bodies. The problems encoun-
tered with the California regulations are examined, followed by a
proposal for a uniform legislative resolution of the fetal research
controversy.
OVERVIEW OF FETAL RESEARCH
Although fetal research is used as a definitive term in itself, it
actually encompasses many types of experimental techniques, each
of which has unique potential benefits that must be balanced against-
concomitant ethical costs. Hence, clarification of the terminology at
the outset is crucial to meaningful legislative analysis.
women. See N. HERSHEY & R. MILLER, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND THE LAW
105-152 (1976).
6. Seventeen states have enacted regulations regarding fetal research: CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-
26, 81-32 (Smith-Hurd 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (Baldwin 1975); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1574 (Supp.
Pamphlet 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12j (West Supp. 1977-1978);
MAINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.035 (Vernon
Cum. Annual 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-617 (Crim. Code Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-4,161 (Reissue 1975); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2445 (McKin-
ney 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2919.14 (Baldwin Current Service 1976); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605 (Purdon
Supp. 1977-1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (Rev. 1977); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-310 (Crim. Code Supp. 1977).
7. The United States Congress placed a moratorium on fetal research until
guidelines could be proposed to regulate research in this area. See National
Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 213, 88 Stat. 353 (1974) (codified in 42
U.S.C. § 2891-1). The moratorium was lifted following an extensive study of fetal
research conducted by the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National Commission), See
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE
FETUS (DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 76-127, 1975), reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (1975)
(partially codified in 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.301 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION'S REPORT]. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS (APPENDIX) (DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 76-
128, 1975)) [hereinafter cited as APPENDIX].
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Research on the fetus after death includes studies of the deceased
fetus or of living tissue cultures grown from recently deceased fet-
uses. 8 Anatomical and chemical studies are performed on completely
dead fetal tissue with the objects of improving methods of disease
detection and of reducing hazards confronted during induced abor-
tions.9 Living fetal tissue has multifarious uses, including aiding
studies of developmental genetic problems, growth regulation, and
discovery of the early antecedents of human disease. 0
Traditionally, this type of experimentation has not been subjected
to the regulations and prohibitions that govern fetal research. Most
jurisdictions have traditionally treated the deceased fetus as any
other deceased person; hence, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gov-
erning the donation of tissue determines the appropriate procedure
to be followed in utilizing this type of fetal material."
Research on the fetus in utero refers to experimentation within the
womb at any time from the point of fertilization until delivery.'
Because the uterus is the natural environment of the fetus, in utero
research is a logical method for studying maternal-fetal interactions.
Such studies can provide normative data for the development of
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures to aid detection and treatment
of fetal disorders." Specific examples of this type of research include
diagnosis of genetic defects from aniotic fluid,1 4 studies of placen-
8. See Note, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implica-
tions, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1198 (1974).
9. See Mahoney, Implications of Restrictions on Fetal Research for
Biomedical Advance, 23 CLINICAL RESEARCH 229, 229 (1975). See also APPENDIX,
supra note 7, at 1-3, 13-4.
10. APPENDIX, supra note 7, at 1-29.
11. "The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), which has been adopted in
all fifty states and the District of Columbia, permits research on the dead fetus
and the products of conception, provided consent has been given by either
parent and the other parent has not objected." COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note
7, at 25, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,536 (1975) (parenthetical original). In addi-
tion to the UAGA, some states have passed varying degrees of restrictions on
research with deceased fetuses. See APPENDIX, supra note 7, at 13-6 to -8.
12. See Martin, Ethical Standards for Fetal Experimentation, 43 FORDHAM
L. REV. 547, 550 (1975).
13. For a general discussion of in utero experimentation, see CoMMISSION'S
REPORT, supra note 7, at 7-8, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,532-33 (1975); P.
RAMSEY, THE ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH 51-57 (1975); Walters, Fetal Research
and the Ethical Issues,HASTINGS CENTER REP.,lJune, 1975, at 13. See also Mirkin,
Impact of Public Policy on the Development of DrugsforPregnant Women and
Children, 23 CLINICAL RESEARCH 233 (1975).
14. Amniotic fluid is the fluid in which the fetus is bathed while in the womb.
See BLAcK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 35 (31st ed. 1976) (defined under "amnion").
tal transfer,15 and intrauterine therapy.16
When a fetus scheduled for abortion is removed from the uterus
and separated from its mother, it is called an abortus. 7 Research
involving a living abortus, classified as ex utero, is uniquely suited
for studying human development because the fetus is so accessible to
experimentation. Examples of ex utero research include studies of
fetal physiology and metabolism, 8 retrieval of organs for use in
investigating biosynthesis, 1 9 and studies directed toward prolonga-
tion of fetal life.
20
Both in utero and ex utero experiments can be conducted for the
benefit of the particular experimental subject involved. Such work
is generally denoted therapeutic. 2' Nontherapeutic work includes
The amniotic fluid contains cells sloughed from the fetus' skin, which is helpful
in genetic diagnosis. See COASUSSION's REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in
40 Fed. Reg. 33,532-33 (1975); Note, Fetal Research: A View from Right to Life to
Wrongful Birth, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133 (1975). See also APPENDIX, supra note
7, at 15-25.
15. Studies of placental transfer include analysis of the effect on the devel-
oping fetus of antibiotics or vaccines administered to the mother and, at some
stages, transmission of compounds introduced into the fetus. Walters, supra
note 13, at 14. See COMMIssION's REPORT, supra note 7, at 11, reprinted in 40 Fed.
Reg. 33,533 (1975); Note, Fetal Research-The Legislative Answer, 78 W. VA. L.
REV. 230, 231-32 (1976).
16. Intrauterine therapy is used to treat the fetus while it is still within the
uterus. Some techniques employed to ensure normal development include trans-
fusions for Rh incompatibility and administration of compounds found lacking
in the fetus. See Walters, supra note 13, at 13. See also COMMISSION's REPORT,
supra note 7, at 10-12, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,532-33 (1975); APPENDIX,
supra note 7, at 1-5 to -21.
17. The term abortus has been eliminated from some fetal research regula-
tions. For example, the National Commission extended the meaning of fetus to
include the fetus ex utero until viability has been reached. The effect was to
delete the term abortus and substitute in its place the term fetus ex utero. See
40 Fed. Reg. 33,526 (1975).
18. These studies are performed on the abortus that continues to live follow-
ing an abortion procedure. Such studies provide information on circulation,
enzymatic composition, and oxidation of nutritional substances. See ComMIs-
SION'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-15, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,532 (1975);
Ramsey, supra note 13, at 59; Walters, supra note 13, at 13.
19. Walters, supra note 13, at 13.
20. Studies on life prolongation are used to develop methods by which prema-
ture infants may be raised to maturity. Incubation, oxygenation, and the use of
artifical placentas are the most widespread techniques now undergoing devel.
opment. See COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 13, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg.
33,533-34 (1975); Walters, supra note 13, at 13. See also Note, Fetal Experimenta-
tion: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1195-97
(1974).
21. Fetal research is generally permitted for therapeutic research, and thus it
becomes crucial to understand the full meaning of what will be defined as
therapeutic. The medical profession has claimed that there is no realistic way to
categorize research as either therapeutic or nontherapeutic, and such attempts
at distinction engender confusion. See text accompanying notes 149-150 infra.
See also P. RAmSEY, THE PATIENT AS A PERSON 11-13 (1970); Levine, The Impact
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studies designed to garner general scientific knowledge and those
directed toward development of procedures which may prove
therapeutic for future fetuses, although of no benefit to the particu-
lar fetus involved in the experiment.
Fetuses are often further classified as viable or nonviable. Medical-
ly, a fetus is considered viable if it is capable of maintaining an
independent existence outside the womb.22 As designated in Roe v.
Wade, viability is the point at which the state develops a compelling
interest in the life of the fetus.23 However, a clear set of criteria for
determining when a fetus may be categorized as viable has not yet
been established.24 Thus, the determination often becomes a matter
of professional judgment on the part of the individual physician
involved in either the abortion or the experiment.25
EMERGENCE OF THE FETAL RESEARCH CONTROVERSY
The emergence of the fetal research controversy in the United
States is most frequently attributed to the Supreme Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade. Although fetal experimentation was being
performed well before 1973, the legalization of demand abortions
greatly increased the number of fetuses available for research and
therefore has brought the issue of fetal research before the public
eye.26 In addition, the refusal of the Supreme Court in this decision to
on Fetal Research of the Report of the National Commissionfor the Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 22 VILL. L. REV.
367, 377-82 (1977).
22. See BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 904 (31st ed. 1976).
23. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
24. According to the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, a fetus is viable when it
is capable of a meaningful life outside the mother's womb. Id. The National
Commission has defined the term "viable infant" similarly: "likely to survive to
the point of sustaining life independently, given the support of available medical
technology." COMUV SSION's REPORT, supra note 7, at 5, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg.
33,531 (1975). The National Commission gave a more concrete guideline for the
determination of a "possibly viable" infant-20 to 24 weeks gestational age and a
weight from 500 to 600 grams. Id. For a discussion of the problems in defining
viability, see Martin, Ethical Standards for Fetal Experimentation, 43 FORD-
HIx L. REV. 547, 564-68 (1975). See also COaMISSION's REPORT, supra note 7, at
53-59, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,542-44 (1975).
25. COMMIssION's REPORT, supra note 7, at 5, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,532
(1975).
26. Note, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1191 n.2 (1974). But see Levine, supra note 21, at 370, for an
argument that even before the Roe decision the supply of fetuses for research
exceeded demand, and the effect of the decision was only to change the type of
fetus available for research.
recognize any rights of the fetus may have contributed to a conclu-
sion that use of this unprotected entity was not violative of ethical
canons, thereby encouraging further experimentation.27
Opponents to the Supreme Court's stance in Roe v, Wade tend to
regard fetal research as inextricably tied to the abortion issue and
therefore have denounced it as morally repugnant. 28 Although the
precise motivation behind the right-to-life groups is unclear, their
position is related to the philosophical presumption that personhood
begins at conception. One author has even suggested that the organ-
ized opposition to fetal research has been motivated by a desire to
override the Roe decision with a constitutional amendment. 29 In
order to facilitate passage of this amendment, these groups may
believe it is necessary to neutralize possible societal gains from the
abortion procedure, one of which is the potential of fetal research to
save future lives.
Regardless of the actual impact of Roe v. Wade upon the perform-
ance of fetal research, the decision was responsible for heightened
public awareness of the ethical dilemmas associated with the issue of
whether fetal rights should be recognized .3o Following the Roe deci-
sion on January 22, 1973, the Washington Post published a series of
articles on fetal research which highlighted some of the questionable
experimental procedures being performed in United States laborato-
ries.31 These articles, combined with increasing public protest over
the abortion decision, prodded the United States Congress into ac-
tion. In July, 1974, a congressional moratorium 32 was imposed on all
fetal research until the newly formulated National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
27. "Little wonder that intelligent people are asking: how can one who has no
right to life itself have the lesser right of precluding experimentation on his or
her person?" COIavssiON's REPORT, supra note 7, at 78, reprinted in 40 Fed.
Reg. 33,549 (1975) (dissenting statement of Commissioner David Louisell).
28. See, e.g., COMvMISSION's REPORT, supra note 7, at 46, reprinted in 40 Fed.
Reg. 33,541 (1975) (testimony of Chris Mooney before the Commission indicating
a fear that researchers might induce women to undergo abortions and that the
desire of researchers to utilize fetuses might hinder developments of alterna-
tives to abortion).
29. Nathan, Fetal Research: An Investigator's View, 22 VILL. L. REv. 384,386
(1977).
30. See McCormick, Fetal Research, Morality, and Public Policy, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., June, 1975, at 26, 29-30, for a discussion of the effect of abortion
policy on experimentation policy. But see Ramsey, supra note 13, at 37, for a
discussion of the need to sever abortion issues from the formulation of fetal
research policy.
31. Cohn, Considering Ethics-Live Fetus Research Debated, Wash. Post,
Apr. 10, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 5, reprinted in 119 CONG. REc. 17,472 (1973); Cohn,
NIH Vows Not to Fund Fetus Work, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 4,
reprinted in 119 CONG. REc. 17,472-73 (1973).
32. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 213, 88 Stat. 353 (1974)
(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1).
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Research (National Commission) could propose recommendations to
guide researchers in this area.33
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE IN CALIFORNIA
The California response to the fetal research controversy followed
quickly in the wake of federal activity. Less than two weeks after
publication of the Washington Post articles, the State Senate in-
troduced a bill relating to research on the fetus.34 A similar bill was
introduced to the members of the California Assembly just one day
later.35 The Senate bill was drafted as an urgency statute which was
to take effect immediately for the preservation of public health and
safety.3 6 In addition, the proposed legislation was explicitly for-
mulated to conform California law to the federal moratorium pro-
hibiting experimentation on the fetus.37
The bill that originated in the State Senate was subjected to
numerous amendments before its final enactment. Intended origi-
nally for incorporation into the Penal Code as a felony violation, the
bill was later transferred to the Health and Safety Code, with a
corresponding reduction of the penalty to an act of unprofessional
misconduct.38 An early revision of the bill limited permissible re-
search solely to tissue specimens obtained from dead fetuses, thereby
preventing experimentation on the intact deceased fetus or its or-
gans.39 This restrictive amendment was later liberalized in the final
bill to include the whole deceased fetus as well as tissue specimens as
suitable research materials. 40 A third modification supported this
liberalizing trend by applying fetal research restrictions only to hu-
man fetuses.4 1 However, this limitation was not incorporated into the
33. Id. § 202(b) (Congress created the National Commission and directed it to
develop guidelines to govern fetal research).
34. S.B. 1046 (enacted 1973, repealed 1975).
35. A.B. 1724 (enacted 1973).
36. The declaration of emergency was added as an amendment to S.B. 1046
on June 13, 1973.
37. S.B. 1046 (as amended in the Senate on June 13, 1973).
38. S.B. 1046 (as amended in the Assembly on Sept. 6, 1973). One hypothesis
for this reduction in penalty is that pressure from lobbying groups favoring
research overcame the initial legislative judgment. "Representatives of Stan-
ford, the University of California, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Zero
Population Growth did succeed in getting the California bill amended." 'Live'
Abortus Research Raises Hackles of Some, Hopes of Others, MED. WORLD NEWS,
Oct. 5, 1973, at 32, 32.
39. S.B. 1046 (as amended in the Senate on June 22, 1973).
40. Id. (as amended in the Assembly on Aug. 23, 1973).
41. Id. (as amended in the Senate on June 13, 1973).
final version of the bill, thus seemingly prohibiting experimentation
upon animal as well as human fetuses. This surprising reversal clear-
ly does not conform to relatively lax regulations found in other areas
of animal research and may simply represent an oversight during the
final formulation of the bill.42
The bill that originated in the State Assembly went through a very
similar metamorphasis from restrictive to more permissive legisla-
tion. The transition from a criminal penalty to a violation of profes-
sional conduct mirrored the activity in the State Senate.4 3 Further-
more, a later amendment included a provision permitting research
designed to protect the life of the particular fetus involved in the
experiment.44 The final version limited the restriction of fetal re-
search only to human products of conception and further defined
what would be considered a lifeless fetus for experimental pur-
poses. 45
Both the Assembly and Senate versions of the fetal research stat-
ute were unanimously passed and signed into law in September,
1973.46 Although very similar, several differences exist between the
42.' The Senate clearly intended to permit research on animal fetuses. On
June 13, 1973, the Senate bill was amended to provide for this contingency. On
September 7, 1973, the Senate also amended the counterpart bill that originated
in the Assembly to permit animal research. Only after the extensive revision of
the complete Senate bill by the Assembly on September 6, which resulted in the
change of penalty from criminal to unprofessional conduct, was the term hu-
man left out of the bill.
43. A.B. 1724 (as amended in the Assembly on June 18, 1973).
44. Id.
45. Id. (as amended in the Senate on Sept. 7, 1973).
46. Id. (as enacted on Sept. 30, 1973):
SECTION 1. Section 25956 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to
read:
25956. (a) It is unlawful for any person to use any aborted produ6t
of human conception, other than fetal remains, for any type of scientific
or laboratory research or for any other kind of experimentation or
study, except to protect or preserve the life and health of the fetus.
"Fetal remains," as used in this section, means a lifeless product of
conception regardless of the duration of pregnancy. A fetus shall not be
deemed to be lifeless for the purposes of this section, unless there is an
absence of a discernible heartbeat.
(b) In addition to any other criminal or civil liability which may be
imposed by law, any violation of this section constitutes unprofessional
conduct within the meaning of the State Medical Practice Act, Chapter 5
(commencing with Section 2000) of Division 2 of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code.
SEc. 2. No appropriation is made by this act, nor is any obligation
created thereby under Section 2164.3 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code, for the reimbursement of any local agency for any costs that may
be incurred by it in carrying on any program or performing any service
required to be carried on or performed by it by this act.
S.B. 1046 (as enacted on Sept. 24, 1973):
SECTION 1. Section 25956 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to
read:
25956. (a) It is unlawful for any person to use any aborted product
of conception, other than fetal remains, for any type of scientific or
laboratory research or for any other kind of experimentation or study,
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two versions. The Senate version was expressly drafted as an urgency
statute designed to conform California law to federal law; the As-
sembly bill contained no such qualification. Only the Assembly bill
contained a definition of a lifeless fetus. Finally, the Assembly bill
applied the research regulations only to human fetuses while the
Senate bill extended them to "any aborted product of conception. '47
Until 1975, the California Health and Safety Code reflected the
provisions of the Assembly act but contained references to the Senate
version as well.4 8 In 1975, two separate bills were introduced in the
State Senate with the express intent of repealing all or part of the
fetal research legislation.49 Senate Bill 679 was intended to repeal
both the Senate and the Assembly acts regarding research on the
fetus, thus completely removing the statute from the Code. Approx-
imately one week after its introduction, the bill was passed to the
Committee on the Judiciary and was returned one year later to the
Secretary of the Senate where it was permanently rejected pursuant
to Joint Rule 56.50
Senate Bill 736, introduced by State Senator Song two days after
the introduction of Senate Bill 679, was intended only to repeal the
Senate's version of fetal research regulation. The Song Bill included
many other minor changes in various statutes and was enacted later
that year.5 ' The practical effect of repealing only one version is very
limited because the Assembly act remains part of the California Code
today.52
except to protect or preserve the life and health of the fetus. "Fetal
remains," as used in this section, means a lifeless product of conception
regardless of the duration of pregnancy.
(b) In addition to any other criminal or civil liability which may be
imposed by law, any violation of this section constitutes unprofessional
conduct within the meaning of the State Medical Practice Act, Chapter 5
(commencing with Section 2000) of Division 2 of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code.
SEc. 2. This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health or safety within the meaning of
Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The
facts constituting such necessity are:
In order to conform California law to federal law prohibiting ex-
perimentation on aborted products of conception, it is necessary that
this act go into effect at the earliest possible date.
47. See note 46 supra.
48. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (Deering 1975).
49. S.B. 679 (introduced on Apr. 1, 1975); S.B. 736 (introduced on Apr. 3,1975).
50. CAL. LEGIS., SENATE FINAL HISTORY 339 (Regular Sess. 1975-1976).
51. Id. at 368.
52. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1977).
INTENT BEHIND THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION
Because the California Legislature does not keep records of most
debates, legislative intent must be ascertained from the drafting
changes embodied in successive versions of the bill. From the history
described in the foregoing paragraphs, a clear trend toward modify-
ing the very restrictive initial prohibitions becomes manifest. Modifi-
cations have included permitting fetal research in animal systems
and permitting use of total human fetal remains. A substantial re-
duction in the severity of the penalty for violating the statute was
present in the final version of both the Assembly and Senate bills.
This trend indicates a recognition of, and sympathy toward, the
medical researcher's potential dilemma.
Conflicts niay be involved in attempting to differentiate ex-
perimentation from application of new but unproven therapeutic
techniques. Despite these potentially obscure areas, it appears that
the legislative intent was to stop experimentation upon aborted hu-
man fetuses but not to hinder utilization of treatment designed to
prolong fetal life.
Because California's statute was enacted to conform to federal law,
a further guide to the legislative intent is the United States Congres-
sional Record reflecting debates upon fetal research that preceded
enactment of the federal moratorium. Representative Angelo Ron-
callo introduced an amendment to the National Science Foundation's
(NSF) authorization bill for the fiscal year 1974, purporting to bar
the use of NSF funds for research upon any aborted fetus with a
beating heart.53 Mr. Roncallo specifically stated that the amendment
was neither intended as an antiabortion bill, 4 nor was it in any way
to restrict the use of experimental therapeutic procedures designed
to save the fetus.55
A major impetus behind the amendment was the series of articles
which appeared in the Washington Post in April, 1973. The author,
Victor Cohn, indicated in his second article that the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) had vowed not to fund research upon
live aborted fetuses. 6 House representatives subsequently wrote the
acting director of the NIH in an attempt to clarify the Institutes'
53. H.R. 7724, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 17,468 (1973): "The secre-
tary may not conduct or support research in the United States or abroad on a
human fetus which is outside the uterus of its mother and which has a beating
heart."
54. Id. But see id. at 17,475 (statement by Mr. Hogan indicating a desire to
restore rights to unborn children, with this amendment operating as a "step in
that direction").
55. Id. at 17,468.
56. Cohn, N!H Vows Not to Fund Fetus Work, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1973, § A,
at 1, col. 4, reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 17,472-73 (1973).
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policy on fetal research. The NIH indicated that it knew of no cir-
cumstances which would justify support for research on a live abort-
ed fetus.57 This statement was deemed inadequate by the House
representatives who thought that the door remained open for future
discoveries of circumstances that would justify such "morally repug-
nant research."58 Consequently, the Roncallo amendment to the NSF
funding legislation passed the House with a strong majority of votes:
354 to 9.59
Approximately five months later Senator James Buckley, Jr. in-
troduced a similar amendment in the United States Senate.61 Al-
though the wording of the amendment was somewhat different from
the House version, it was clearly comparable. In fact, Mr. Buckley
stated that Mr. Roncallo's office "assures me that it is fully in keep-
ing with the intention of his amendment." 6' The new rider, to be
attached to the NIH funding authorization bill, incorporated a pro-
hibition on funding of research performed before as well as after an
induced abortion and thus was substantially more restrictive than its
predecessor in the House.
Underlying the Buckley amendment was a concern over appropri-
ate consent procedures for research on the fetus and a fear that the
justification of "social utility" would become incorporated into the
canons of medical ethics.62 Although not expressly stated by Senator
Buckley, an examination of the legislative history indicates that
some of the proponents of the more restrictive complete ban on
federal funding of fetal research were motivated by a desire to return
to the fetus some basic rights which they believed had been denied by
the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.63
Senator Kennedy, acknowledging similar concerns over the
consent problem, cited potential medical advances as motivation for
57. 119 CONG. REC. 17,470-71 (1973) (exchange of letters between members of
Congress and NIH).
58. Id. at 17,471 (statement of Mr. Mazzoli).
59. Id. at 17,476.
60. "The Secretary may not conduct or support research or experimentation
in the United States or abroad on a living human fetus or infant, whether before
or after induced abortion, unless such research or experimentation is done for
the purpose of insuring the survival of that fetus or infant." Id. at 29225 (pro-
posed Senate Amendment to H.R. 7724, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC.
17,468 (1973)).
61. 119 CONG. REC. 29,225 (1973).
62. Id. at 29,227-28.
63. Id. at 17,475 (statement of Rep. Hogan).
a less restrictive amendment.64 He proposed that Mr. Buckley's per-
manent ban on funding fetal experimentation be modified by placing
a moratorium on fetal research only until the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects could study the problems and
propose suitable guidelines for researchers in this area.65 This
amendment proposing a moratorium was unanimously passed by the
Senate and later became law as part of the National Research Act of
1974.66 .
The congressional intent underlying the federal moratorium is
clear. The need for medical research, due to its potential benefits for
all fetuses, is justification for permitting carefully regulated research
on the fetus. A commission composed of experts in the legal, medical,
and ethical fields was to study the issues involved and develop ap-
propriate guidelines. 67 Until such time as directives and regulations
were formulated, research was temporarily halted.
Although the motivation for research regulations at both the state
and federal level was similar, a comparison of the California fetal
research legislation with the federal moratorium causes certain dif-
ferences to surface.68 The California statute is a permanent addition
to the state's.legal system. In 1975, after the federal moratorium was
lifted, the State Senate's version of the fetal research regulations,
which was explicitly enacted to conform to the federal moratorium,
was selectively repealed,69 leaving intact the Assembly version of the
bill which had not been enacted as an urgency measure and did not
purport to conform to federal law.7 0 In addition, the California re-
strictions upon research found in both Assembly and Senate versions
would seemingly apply only to research performed upon an aborted
fetus,7 1 while the federal moratorium prohibited experimentation
both before and after an induced abortion.7 2
64. Id. at 29,228-29.
65. See id. at 29,229.
66. National Research Act, Pub. L. 93-348, § 202, 88 Stat. 350 (1974) (codi-
fied in 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1) (expressly gives the National Commission four
months from the date it convenes to formulate its recommendations on fetal
research). In actuality, incorporating delays in the swearing in of National
Commission members, the moratorium extended for a period of ten months.
See Levine, supra note 21, at 373.
67. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (1975) (listing members of the National Commission).
68. It is important to keep in mind that the federal regulations apply only to
federally funded research. When a California laboratory receives federal fund-
ing, it is subject to both state and federal regulations. However, in cases of
conflict between the restrictions, the state regulations are to be followed so long
as they are at least as protective of fetal rights as are federal regulations. See 45
C.F.R. § 46.201(b) (1976).
69. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1977).
72. National Research Act, Pub. L. 93-348, § 213,88 Stat. 353 (1974) (odified in
42 U.S.C. § 2891-1).
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Despite the differences reflected in the final legislation, the
California and federal regulations are analogous, and the intention of
the legislatures at both levels is essentially the same. Both the
California law and the federal moratorium contain special excep-
tions permitting research that is intended to protect or to preserve
the life of the fetus.13 Thus, both legislative bodies accepted ex-
perimentation designed to benefit the experimental subject but re-
jected work which might potentially benefit other fetuses but was of
no therapeutic value to the particular subject.
EFFECTUATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The immediate question is whether the suggested intent of the
California legislation has been effectuated by the fetal research reg-
ulations. The statute expressly limits research upon aborted products
of human conception but makes no reference to any other stage of
fetal development. By implication, therefore, the statute fails to re-
gulate research on a fetus prior to abortion.
This omission in the statute permits some of the more controversial
types of fetal research.74 First, it is conceivable that a researcher
could conduct experiments upon a fetus prior to, but in anticipation
of, abortion. Provided the analysis of the fetus following abortion is
restricted to fetal remains, no technical violation of the statute would
have occurred.75 Clearly, the lack of any restrictions upon in utero
research controverts legislative intent. If the California Legislature
had planned to permit continuation of only in utero diagnostic pro-
cedures, this intention could have been effectively handled while still
regulating nontherapeutic procedures.
Second, depending upon the definition of "aborted," the statute
may possibly be interpreted as permitting experimentation during
the interim period between removal of the fetus from the womb and
severance of the umbilical cord. This research raises very sensitive
ethical issues because the fetus may be considered a dying subject at
73. Id; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1977).
74. Some of the experiments which have stirred the greatest public outrage
involve in utero studies. See, e.g., Philipson, Sabath, & Charles, Transplacental
Passage of Erythromycin and Clindamycin, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1219 (1973)
(the Philipson experiment resulted in prosecution of the researchers for grave-
robbing (see text accompanying notes 103-06 infra)).
75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1977) (permits research
on fetal remains). Although there has not been a technical violation of the
California statute, a possible violation of federal regulations may have occurred
if the laboratory receives federal funding. See note 68 supra.
this point. 6 Once again the controversial nature of this type of ex-
perimentation would indicate that the California Legislature did not
impliedly intend to permit such work.
Thus, the only explicitly prohibited procedure in California is ex
utero research upon a living fetus. The determination of whether ex
utero experimentation may be conducted will hinge upon whether it
can be classified as therapeutic. There is no bright-line test for
making this distinction. The effect is to place the physician in the
precarious position of deciding whether to employ a potentially
therapeutic procedure based on his or her determination of its possi-
ble benefit to the particular fetus involved.
If the legislature intended only to prohibit ex utero experimenta-
tion on a live fetus, the fetal research regulations could now be
totally repealed without repercussion. The California Health and
Safety Code already requires that a fetus "prematurely born alive in
the course of an abortion" be accorded the same rights to medical
treatment as any other infant." Thus, it can be argued that a physi-
cian is already requirel to perform any potentially therapeutic pro-
cedures and similarly may not negatively interfere with the fetus'
.chance for survival by experimenting with a nontherapeutic research
technique.
THE EFcT OF FETAL RESEARCH REGULATIONS UPON
CALIFORNIA RESEARCH
Despite the inherent ambiguities within the statute which might
easily have been exploited, research in California has not been ex-
tended into questionable areas. Precisely because ambiguities exist,
such research runs a high risk of subjecting the physician to charges
of unprofessional conduct and thus is best left to laboratories in
other states.
Some California laboratories continue to work toward devel-
opment of therapeutic, diagnostic procedures."8 As the experiments
76. "But there can be no obligation-indeed, it would be positively wrong-to
obtain those results by means of abortuses who are hovering between life and
death precisely because for them no such rescue or remedies were wanted."
Ramsey, supra note 13, at 34-35 (it should be noted that Ramsey includes all
fetuses scheduled for abortion in his analogy of a fetus to a dying adult).
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.9 (West Supp. 1977).
78. For example, Dr. Louis Gluck, a professor at the University of California
at San Diego, is continuing to work on diagnosis and treatment for respiratory
distress syndrome, a common cause of death in premature infants. His tech-
nique involves analysis of amniotic fluid to determine the lecithinlsphingomy-
elin ratio which indicates lung maturity. See Gluck, Fetal Maturity and Am.
niotic Fluid Surfactant Determination, in MANAGEMENT OF THE HIGH-RISK
PREGNANCY 189 (W. Spellacy ed. 1976).
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progress and skills become more sophisticated, animal systems will
become unsatisfactory and the procedures will need to be tested upon
human fetuses. At this point the confusion and misinterpretations
generated by the California legislation may hinder the final step in
development and thus indirectly defeat legislative intent.
ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION AT THE STATE LEVEL
Given the problems inextricably tied to state legislative efforts,
alternate resolutions to the fetal research controversy need to be
considered.
Resolution Within the Medical Community
An alternative to policy formulation by state legislators would be
to return control over fetal research to the medical profession.7 9
England has opted for this course of action. An advisory group was
formed in response to reports that a commercial sale of fetuses for
medical purposes was being conducted.8 0 The English Advisory
Group concluded that clinical decisions would best be made by clini-
cians and that ethical decisions should be made by the medical
profession as a whole.8 ' Consequently, research is governed by a set
of guidelines outlining professional conduct. These guidelines are
formulated by the medical community and approved by the Depart-
ment of Health and Social Security.82 No legislation has as yet been
passed.
The United States' medical community has not ignored the ethical
problems of its profession.83 As far back as March, 1972, the advisory
council in the Human Embryology and Development study section of
the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development had
proposed regulations for fetal research.8 4 The council agreed that
79. See Note, Fetal Research: A View from Right to Life to Wrongful Birth,
52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 142 (1975) (advocates returning control of certain types
of fetal research to physicians).
80. Research on the Fetus, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 550, 551 (1972).
81. The Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material for Research, Report of the Advis-
ory Group, chaired by Sir John Peel (London, 1972) reprinted in APPENDIX,
supra note 7, at 19-1.
82. For a general discussion of the Peel Report, see Ramsey, supra note 13, at
1-3.
83. For a discussion of the medical profession's activities in similar ethical
problem areas, see Note, Fetal Research: A View from Right to Life to Wrong-
ful Birth, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 146-151 (1975).
84. Ramsey, supra note 13, at 3-4.
fetal research should be encouraged, but only through planned scien-
tific studies that conformed to acceptable safeguards. These policy
proposals were not implemented because of the intervening emer-
gence into public view of the fetal research controversy and subse-
quent legislative resolution.85
Clearly, the medical profession should have some input into the
regulation of fetal research. Physicians are more directly affected by
limitations on experimentation than are members of other profes-
sions and, consequently, are more sensitive to the professional dilem-
ma tied to the ethical considerations. In "addition, the medical profes-
sion is best equipped to balance the probative worth of a proposed
experiment with scientific need. An individual examination of
proposed experiments by a peer group would be invaluable, and
perhaps indispensable, to a meaningful determination of the permis-
sibility of an experiment.
However, the medical profession should not be the sole source of
regulation. The zeal for scientific advancement should be tempered
by input severed from the influence of the research world. Further-
more, the sanctions available to the medical community without
benefit of legislative intervention are limited.86 For example, one
physician has proposed that experimental procedures be policed by
prohibiting publication of the experimental results, or in the alterna-
tive, by publication accompanied by stern editorial comment.87 Fi-
nally, the resolution of the fetal research controversy concerns all
members of the community because it touches upon vital ethical
questions with far-reaching repercussions. Therefore, no truly ac-
ceptable solution can emerge without consideration of as many dif-
ferent perspectives as possible. The issues tied to fetal research ex-
tend beyond the boundaries of the medical profession and therefore
cannot be resolved with the research community in isolation.
Physicians have some input into state legislation through various
lobbying groups.88 However, the state level prohibition on certain
types of research precludes a meaningful individual analysis of these
85. The study and subsequent proposals became the impetus for the Wash-
ington Post articles that served to initiate the fetal research controversy in the
United States. See Ramsey, supra note 13, at 5. See also text accompanying note
56 supra.
86. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2360-2411 (West 1974) (allows physicians to
police their profession by suspending or revoking licenses to practice). Califor-
nia physicians could interpret violation of fetal research regulations as a mor-
ally reprehensible act that falls within the Code. Historically, this deterrent has
seldom been used.
87. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1360(1966). See also Ingelfinger, The Unethical in Medical Ethics, 83 ANNALS INTER-
NAL MED. 264 (1975).
88. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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types of experiments for scientific need. Physician input is greater at
the federal level. The federal regulations as promulgated by the
National Commission are structured in such a way as to encourage
peer review of each proposed experiment before a decision as to its
permissibility is made.89 Further physician input is available at the
federal level through, membership on the National Commission it-
self.9"
Massachusetts Legislation
Lauded as a compromise between scientist and legislator, the Mas-
sachusetts statute has been in force since 1974.91 Although this stat-
ute has been labeled as more liberal than legislation in other states,
92
its restrictions are greater than those found in California.9 3 The
physician may not conduct in utero or ex utero experimentation
unless the procedure will not "substantially jeopardize the life or
health of the fetus." 94 This exception was incorporated to ensure that
certain diagnostic procedures which entail little threat to the fetus
could be continued. 95
However, no research may be performed on a fetus scheduled for
abortion.9 6 This complete restriction on utilization of fetuses prior to
abortion can produce anomalous results. If taken literally, this would
imply that when a woman with a high risk of bearing children with a
particular diagnosable genetic defect comes into a clinic for an abor-
89. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.204, 46.205 (1976) (duties of the Institutional Review
Board with respect to fetal research). For an analysis of the responsibilities of
the Institutional Review Board and its relationship to the individual inves-
tigator, see N. HERSHEY & R. MILLER, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND THE LAW
(1976).
90. Three out of the initial 11 National Commissioners were members of the
medical community. See 40 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (1975).
91. 1974 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 421 (codified atMAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
112, § 12j (West Supp. 1977-1978)). See Culliton, Fetal Research: The Case His-
tory of a Massachusetts Law, 187 SCIENCE 237 (1975); Culliton, Fetal Research
aI): The Nature of a Massachusetts Law, 187 SCIENCE 411 (1975) (reports on the
controversy between scientist and legislator lying behind the legislation).
92. Culliton, Fetal Research: The Case History of a Massachusetts Law, 187
SCIENCE 237, 241 (1975).
93. For example, Massachusetts law still imposes a criminal penalty for viola-
tion of the statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12j (West Supp. 1977-1978).
94. Id.
95. See Culliton, Fetal Research: The Case History of a Massachusetts Law,
187 SCIENCE 237, 240-41 (1975).
96. "No person shall use any live human fetus, whether before or after expul-
sion from its mother's womb, for scientific, laboratory, research ... ." MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12j (West Supp. 1977-1978).
tion, she may not undergo amniocentesis to determine whether the
child she is carrying is afflicted."
The struggle in Massachusetts is far from finished. Many physi-
cians are still attempting to convince the legislature that such re-
strictive regulations are not necessary.98 Furthermore, prior to enact-
ment of the fetal research statute, an investigation of Boston City
Hospital for possible violations of the abortion statute culminated in
the initiation of two criminal prosecutions against physicians. 9 The
first of these criminal prosecutions was the case of Commonwealth v.
Edelin.100 This case involved a manslaughter charge against a physi-
cian who had failed to employ life-saving techniques to prolong the
life of an aborted fetus.
Although the Edelin case does not involve fetal research per se, it
affects fetal research in two ways. First, it solidifies the fears of
physicians who may have felt that the threat of prosecution would be
wielded as a political weapon. 10 Second, it tends to create an affir-
mative duty to employ all available life-prolongation methods to a
fetus who is estimated to have reached the gestational age of at least
twenty-four weeks.102 Thus, on the one hand, the physician is forbid-
den from performing any experimentation on the fetus, while on the
other hand, the physician faces prosecution if he fails to do whatever
is in his power to prolong the infant's life. The doctor must therefore
make a split-second decision as to whether a particular procedure
may be classified as therapeutic for that particular fetus.
97. "[I]f I could diagnose sickle cell anemia ... and thalassemia and other
disorders in utero, I'd be preventing more abortions .... " Culliton, Fetal Re-
search: The Case History of a Massachusetts Law, 187 SCIENCE 237, 238 (1975)
(quoting Massachusetts physician Dr. Nathan).
98. "[I have been] becoming involved with the physicians and legislature in
trying to develop some kind of reasonable case to present to the legislature, as to
why we should not have such restrictive experimentation legislation." GENETICS
AND THE LAW 46 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976) (statement by Mr. Chayet,
attorney for the Massachusetts physicians charged with grave-robbing (see text
accompanying note 103 infra)).
99. For a history of these cases, see Culliton, Abortion and Manslaughter: A
Boston Doctor Goes on Trial, 187 SCIENCE 334 (1975); Culliton, Grave-Robbing:
The Charge against Four from Boston City Hospital, 186 SCIENCE 420 (1974).
100. - Mass. -, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976).
101. "Why is Kenneth Edelin being prosecuted for manslaughter? Many Bos-
ton doctors and lawyers are convinced it is for political reasons. They point out
that this is an election year, that long time district attorney Garrett H. Bryne was
in a tough primary race and needed publicity." Culliton, Manslaughter: The
Charge against Edelin of Boston City Hospital, 186 SCIENCE 327,328 (1974). See
also Ingelfinger, The Unethical in Medical Ethics, 83 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
264 (1975).
102. "This judgment could lead to extraordinary efforts to sustain life against
all odds of a successful outcome of an intact human being." APPENDIX, supra
note 7, at 14-5 (quoting Dr. Mary Avery, chief physician at Children's Hospital
Medical Center in Boston).
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The second case, Commonwealth v. Berman,'0 ' may have an even
greater impact upon fetal research. The physicians in this case were
attempting to determine whether particular antibiotics orally ad-
ministered to pregnant women would reach the fetus in therapeutic
levels. 0 4 Abortions by hysterotomy were performed on women
scheduled for abortion following administration of the drug. An
assay for antibiotic levels in the fetus was performed upon the am-
niotic fluid, fetal liver, spleen, kidney, lung, brain, and muscle.
Consent had been obtained for the experiment from the women prior
to abortion.10 5 Nevertheless, charges of grave-robbing were brought
against the physicians who participated in the experiment.106 The
case has not yet been brought to trial, and thus its full impact cannot
be ascertained. Because fetuses scheduled for abortion were the ex-
perimental subjects, under the present Massachusetts statute the
Berman experiment would be found illegal.
Although the Massachusetts statute clarifies some of the am-
biguities found in California law,0 7 the conflict between compliance
with federal and state regulations is still present. A physician receiv-
ing federal funds must ascertain the feasibility of each experimental
procedure under the regulations at both the federal and state level.
Further, although therapeutic research is permitted in Mas-
sachusetts, physicians remain reluctant to risk the possibility of
criminal prosecution, and thus the potential benefits of fetal research
are still not being realized. 10 8
103. Crim. No. 81821 (Super. Ct. Suffolk Cty., Mass., filed Apr. 17, 1974). See
also Culliton, Grave-Robbing: The Charge against Four from Boston City Hos-
pital, 186 SCIENCE 420 (1974).
104. Philipson, Sabath, & Charles, Transplacental Passage of Erythromycin
and Clindamycin, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1219, 1219 (1973).
105. The women consented to participate in the study; however, the research-
ers failed to obtain the mother's consent for the analysis to be performed on the
aborted fetus. See Culliton, Grave-Robbing: The Charge against Four from
Boston City Hospital, 186 SCIENCE 420, 420 (1974).
106. The grave-robbing statute states: "Whoever conveys away without being
lawfully authorized the remains of a human body may be sentenced to a term of
years in the state prison and fined." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 71 (West
1968). The argument against the physicians goes as follows: The abortus was
transported from the delivery room to the laboratory for analysis and thus there
was a conveyance of a human body. Because the doctor had no burial permit, a
violation of the statute had occurred. GENETICS AND THE LAW 46 (A. Milunsky &
G. Annas eds. 1976) (statement by Mr. Chayet, attorney for the defendants).
107. The Massachusetts legislation is much more explicit on regulation of in
utero research-it leaves nothing open for implication.
108. "Researchers who wish to do investigative studies in fetal development
in Massachusetts will be in very uncertain territory where a wrong step may
Regulation at the Federal Level
Along with the moratorium on fetal research, the United States
Congress established the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National
Commission).10 9 The National Commission was instructed to investi-
gate the nature and extent of fetal research and to recommend
policies under which some research might be conducted or support-
ed.1 0 The moratorium was to extend only until the National
Commission's recommendations were formulated."'
The final report of the National Commission, entitled "Research on
the Fetus," is a comprehensive evaluation of the ethical problems
associated with fetal research and a guide to research protocol which
best complies with the National Commission's resolution of ethical
questions. The National Commission determined that prerequisites
to any fetal research should include evidence that pertinent investi-
gations hd been conducted in animal models and nonpregnant hu-
mans, an assessment of the risks and benefits of the project, and
compliance with procedures to insure that informed consent had
been sought and granted under proper conditions." 2
The National Commission unanimously agreed that therapeutic
research complying with the appropriate prerequisites was permissi-
ble." 3 Nontherapeutic research involving a fetus going to term, or a
fetus scheduled for abortion, may be conducted provided the risk of
fetal harm is minimal. 1 4 In cases presenting special problems, ap-
proval of a national ethical review board is required before any
funding may be considered." 5 In addition, questionable research is
subject to the proviso that the knowledge to be gained is of medical
importance, cannot be obtained in another way, and does not offend
community sensibilities. 116
California could follow the step taken by New York and incorpo-
result in egregious criminal prosecution and a ruined career." Curran, Ex-
perimentation Becomes a Crime: Fetal Research in Massachusetts, 292 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 300,301(1975). But cf. Culliton, Fetal Research (II): The Nature of a
Massachusetts Law, 187 SCIENCE 411, 412 (1975) (a drafter of the legislation
argues that the criminal nature of the statute is really a protection because it
puts a difficult burden of proof on the prosecution).
109. National Research Act, Pub. L. 93-348, § 202, 88 Stat. 350 (1974) (codified
in 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 213, 88 Stat. 353.
112. ComavssioN's REPORT, supra note 7, at 64, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg.
33,545 (1975).
113. Id.
114. Id., reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. at 33,546.
115. Id., reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. at 33,547.
116. Id.
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rate the provisions of the federal regulations into its state statutes."l 7
This step would certainly benefit those researchers who accept both
federal and state funds because it would require conformance with
only one set of regulations. Further advantages would accrie to all
members of the research community from the greater clarity of the
federal regulations. The discussion which surrounded the adoption of
each regulation is available to public inspection through the Federal
Register, and the rationale behind each regulation is clearly ar-
ticulated.
In addition to simplifying paperwork procedures and providing
greater certainty for researchers, the adoption of uniform federal
regulations would ease present pressures on the state legislature. The
federal regulations undergo periodic reviews and are subject to mod-
ification.n 8 This procedure should allow greater flexibility and
greater speed in changing regulations to conform to scientific need
and public demand than does a formal repeal or revision of a state
statute. Any person may file objections or opinions on policies with
the National Commission, and thus the public is guaranteed a mech-
anism for input."9
Finally, and perhaps of the greatest benefit, the National Commis-
sion is composed of eleven members representing experts in a diver-
sity of fields.120 The same National Commission also investigates and
proposes regulations in other areas of ethical controversy. 121 Thus,
the composition of the National Commission is infinitely better
suited to deal with complex interdisciplinary ethical issues because
the members have more time to debate issues and are less susceptible
to media pressure than are individual state legislators.
117. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2445 (McKinney 1976-1977). New York law
regulates human research, but research covered by federal regulations is
exempted from compliance with state regulations.
118. For example, following publication of its regulations, HEW received
numerous criticisms directed toward 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1976) and has accord-
ingly changed the regulation. See 42 Fed. Reg. 2792 (1977). See also text accom-
panying notes 151-54 infra.
119. The initial hearings of the National Commission were open to the public
where views of concerned citizens could be discussed. Once the recommenda-
tions were complete and HEW had promulgated its regulations, the public was
invited to comment in writing. These comments have not gone unheeded. See
note 118 supra.
120. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (1975).
121. National Research Act, Pub. L. 93-348, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 349 (1974) (codi-
fied in 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1) (authorizes the National Commission to study and
to formulate recommendations to guide experimentation in many areas, includ-
ing research on prisoners, the mentally infirm, and pregnant women.
The argument against adoption of federal regulations at the state
level is largely based on an objection to formulation of controversial
ethical policies by a National Commission that may be isolated and
beyond the reach of the public. There is some concern that the
National Commission's hearings are not as accessible to the public as
perhaps they might have been because "[m]ore than written
comments should have been invited."'12 2 Furthermore, there is some
question about the propriety of formulating medical policy by a
process that "terminates in the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare."12
3
A further objection to the National Commission as a policy-making
body involves a concern that crucial decisions will be determined on
the basis of a bare majority: "[W]ill eternal ethical verities be deter-
mined by six to five votes?"'124 This argument is possibly countered by
a reminder that numerous Supreme Court decisions involving highly
controversial issues are resolved by the swing of a single vote.
The medical community has voiced numerous complaints against
attempts to regulate experimentation. One major complaint has been
with the bureaucracy and the increased number of hours required to
comply with the National Commission's regulations and review
committees. 2
5
If the National Commission is accepted as an appropriate body for
proposing regulations that will be implemented on the state level,
will the present regulations regarding fetal research effectuate the
intent of the California Legislature? This Comment has previously
analogized the intent of the United States Congress and the state
legislature, concluding that both legislative bodies were motivated
by similar intentions.2 6
The effectiveness of the federal regulations can in part be meas-
ured by the request for fetal research funding. There has been a sharp
decline in grant requests from the NIH since the controversy be-
gan.' 27 This decline can be explained by several factors other than a
deficiency in the proposed regulations.
122. Ramsey, supra note 13, at 14.
123. Id. at 12.
124. Ingelfinger, The Unethical in Medical Ethics, 83 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
264, 267 (1975). But see Ingelfinger, Ethics of Human Experimentation Defined
by a National Commission, 296 NEw ENG. J. MED. 44 (1977) (the author concedes
that his fears about the National Commission have not been realized).
125. Ingelfinger, The Unethical in Medical Ethics, 83 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
264 (1975). For a discussion of specific objections to the federal regulations from
a medical perspective, see Position Statement of the American Federation for
Clinical Research on the DHEW Proposed Rules on Protection of Human
Subjects, 23 CLINICAL RESEARCH 53 (1975).
126. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
127. Levine, supra note 21, at 367-69.
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The moratorium on research at the federal level spanned a period
of approximately ten months. 2 ' When the moratorium began, those
laboratories engaged in fetal research were forced to abandon ongo-
ing projects for an uncertain length of time.129 The establishment of a
laboratory is an expensive and time-consuming endeavor. A team of
specialized personnel can take years to organize. Once such a
moratorium is lifted, several years of lag-time may be required to
revitalize laboritories, test the new regulations, and bolster confi-
dence in the future of fetal research before numerous requests for
grants can be expected.
In addition, the National Commission's regulations specify that in
areas of conflict state laws will govern provided that minimum pro-
tections are maintained. 3 0 Thus, the paucity of grant requests can in
part be attributed to restrictive legislation at the state level. Califor-
nia and Massachusetts, both major centers of medical research, have
legislation restricting research. The NIH cannot expect to fund a
great number of experiments in these jurisdictions.
A prediction has been made that fetal research will regain momen-
tum within the next few years under the present set of National
Commission regulations.'' Thus, in time, the federal regulations may
be able to replace California's statute and serve better to effectuate
California's legislative intent in regulating fetal research.
UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS WITH FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Despite the attraction of adopting the federal regulations at the
state level, there are serious ethical problems that have not yet been
satisfactorily resolved by the National Commission. Among these
problems are questions regarding efficacious consent procedures, the
distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research, and
proper treatment of a particular category of fetus, namely the nonvi-
able fetus ex utero.
Consent
A determination of whether consent should be required for fetal
research, and if so, from whom and under what conditions, is perhaps
128. See note 66 supra.
129. Levine, supra note 21, at 373.
130. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(b) (1976).
131. Nathan, Fetal Research: An Investigator's View, 22 VILL. L. REV. 384,
394 (1977).
the most complex issue underlying fetal research. Consent is a pre-
requisite for human experimentation-to require efficacious consent
on behalf of the fetus implies a presumption that human qualities
may be attributed to the fetus and that the fetus is a legal person.
In order to surmount the initial barrier of a decision to require
consent, one must make two initial suppositions. 3 2 First, the status
of the fetus must be resolved in such a way as to make the fetus an
entity to whom definite rights may be accorded. 3 3 Clearly, for those
who regard the fetus as a mass of tissue, no consent for experimenta-
tion should be necessary. The National Commission declined to as-
sert affirmatively the civil status of the fetus or to resolve the issue of
personhood but was convinced that the fetus, because it shares in
human genetic heritage, should be treated with respect and dig-
nity. 34
A second presupposition to requiring consent for fetal experimen-
tation is a conclusion that Roe v. Wade was not an affirmative denial
of fetal rights in all instances. 135 This supposition can be reached by
focusing on the Supreme Court's limited denial of fetal rights. Dur-
ing the first trimester, if a conflict exists between the mother's right
to privacy and the fetus' right to life, the mother may choose to have
the fetus removed from her body. However, if no conflict exists, Roe
v. Wade does not necessarily require that the mother's decision with
regard to care and treatment of the fetus should govern. Fetal re-
search was not an issue in Roe v. Wade, and thus the Court's decision
does not mandate the nonexistence of human rights prior to birth
when the maternal right to privacy is not involved. 136
Given that the fetus is a legal person and that consent may be
required for fetal research, from whom should it be obtained? When
research is being conducted on both mother and fetus, maternal
consent clearly is necessary for the portion of research to be
performed on the mother. However, the fetus is not capable of
consenting on its own behalf, and thus some form of proxy consent is
necessary. The regulations published by the HEW require the consent
of both parents.'37 If the father is not available, or if the pregnancy
resulted from rape, the necessity of obtaining his consent may be
dispensed with.138
132. See Tiefel, The Cost of Fetal Research: Ethical Considerations, 294 NMI
ENG. J. IIED. 85, 87 (1976).
133. Id.
134. Co=unssioN's REPORT, supra note 7, at 62, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg.
33,544 (1975).
135. Tiefel, The Cost of Fetal Research: Ethical Considerations, 294 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 85, 87 (1976).
136. See id. See also Horan, Fetal Experimentation and Federal Regu-
lation, 22 VILL. L. REv. 325, 338 (1977).
137. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.208, 46.209 (1976).
138. Id. This exception is another example of an alteration in the National
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In cases where the research is to benefit either the mother, the fetus
going to term, or the spontaneously aborted fetus, maternal consent
is appropriate. Therefore, problems with the HEW consent require-
ments arise only in very specific situations. For example, some
commentators argue that a mother's decision to abort will generally
disqualify her from consenting to experimentation on behalf of the
unborn child and that proxy consent from an advocate or guardian
should be required.139 Another position is that the mother has not
abandoned her interest in the fetus' well-being by consenting to an
abortion. However, if the fetus is scheduled for abortion and the
proposed research is designed to prolong the life of the fetus after
abortion, a conflict of interest could arise between the mother's
decision to terminate the life of the fetus and the life-saving potential
of the research.140 Although this problem would arise infrequently,
its resolution is extremely difficult. A deprivation of the mother's
right to consent in a situation where she plans an abortion may be
considered an unconstitutional penalty under Roe v. Wade because it
differentiates between a spontaneous and an induced abortion.' 41
Another situation in which consent problems arise is when non-
therapeutic in utero research is planned. Some commentators believe
that a parent never has the right to consent to nontherapeutic ex-
perimentation. 42 Others feel that because a decision to abort poses a
difficult moral dilemma for the parents, the option to reverse the
decision should be available until the procedure is performed. 41
However, if a mother consents to experimentation prior to abortion,
Commission's recommendations by HEW. The National Commission suggested
that maternal consent alone be enough to permit in utero experimentation
subject to a veto from the father. COMmissIoN's REPORT, supra note 7, at 74,
reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,547-48 (1975).
139. Ramsey, supra note 13, at 89-99.
140. See generally CoNMLssION's REPORT, supra note 7, at 26, reprinted in 40
Fed. Reg. 33,537 (1975); McCormick, Fetal Research, Morality, and Public Poli-
Cy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1975, at 26, 28-29.
141. "Since the Supreme Court has declared in Roe v. Wade that women have
a constitutional right to abortion, basing maternal disqualification on the exer-
cise of that right may be an unconstitutional penalty." CoMISSION's REPORT,
supra note 7, at 26, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,537 (1975).
142. Ramsey, supra note 13, at 92.
143. Wasserstrom, The Status of the Fetus, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June,
1975, at 18, 22. But see Position Statement of the American Federation for
Clinical Research on the DHEW Proposed Rules on Protection of Human
Subjects, 23 CLINICAL RESEARCH 53,56 (1975) (the probability of a woman chang-
ing her mind about an abortion is slight and therefore should not be a relevant
factor in determining consent procedure).
her decision to abort may become irrevocable in a practical sense
through fear of potential birth defects resulting from the experiment.
Further, because the mother may change her mind after the experi-
ment has begun, the father, who may eventually bear the financial
responsibility for raising the child, should be able to assert his inter-
est in the unborn child.'" Thus, unless consent for nontherapeutic
research is tied to an agreement to abort, the father's consent should
also be required.
45
The federal requirement of paternal consent when the father is
available may be subject to constitutional objections. In Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth,'46 the Supreme Court held that statutory
provisions requiring paternal consent to first-trimester abortions
were unconstitutional. If the father may not prevent termination of
the pregnancy, has he the lesser right to determine whether a par-
ticular procedure may be performed prior to termination of this
pregnancy?147 The resolution of this question is particularly difficult
because there is a clash between two policies. On the one hand, a
woman should be able to consent to any in utero research on her own
because it involves control over her own body. Conversely, the father
may eventually bear the financial burden of raising the child if the
mother should later change her mind about the abortion.
Therapeutic v. Nontherapeutic Research
A second source of conceptual difficulty with the National
Commission's recommendations involves the categorization of re-
search as either therapeutic or nontherapeutic. Many commentators
feel that this distinction is artificial and therefore should be aban-
doned. 48 The confusion in attempting to classify research as either
one or the other may obscure important moral issues which should be
implemented into the decision of whether to conduct the research at
all. There are some indications that the National Commission is
willing to accept new terminology. 49
144. COMMSSION'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 28, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg.
33,537 (1975).
145. It has been suggested that such an agreement would be unenforceable.
Id.
146. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
147. For a discussion of why the father should still have input into the ex-
perimentation decision, see Wilson, Fetal Experimentation: Rights of the
Father and Questions of Personhood, 22 VILL. L. REv. 403, 409 (1977).
148. See Lebacqz, Reflections on the Report and Recommendations of the
National Commission: Research on the Fetus, 22 VILL. L. REV. 357,361-66 (1977);
Levine, supra note 21, at 377-82.
149. Levine, supra note 21, at 379.
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Research on the Non-Viable Fetus Ex Utero
One hotly contested decision made by the National Commission is
the permissibility of utilization of the nonviable fetus ex utero. The
nonviable fetus ex utero is a living abortus who cannot survive to
childhood even when aided with the most advanced modem medical
techniques. 1 0 Any research performed on such a subject is by defini-
tion nontherapeutic. The National Commission recommended that
such research be permitted, provided that the fetus was less than
twenty weeks gestational age and that no significant procedural
changes were introduced into the abortion procedure. 151 These rec-
ommendations were adopted by HEW in its regulations. 152 However,
the National Commission initially included a further restriction on
such research by requiring that no intrusion into the fetus be made
that would alter the duration of its life. Although this restriction was
omitted by HEW in its regulations as promulgated in 1975, a 1977
amendment adopted the limitation upon research.'53
Strenuous objection to this type of research is based on two argu-
ments: The fetus is at this point technically an infant and should be
accorded equivalent rights, and the dying fetus should be treated in
the same manner as a dying adult.5 4 Under either analogy the nonvi-
able fetus ex utero is a person under the law and should be accorded
the same rights as other persons.
However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Planned Par-
enthood v. Danforth contains some language which may indicate
that a physician's duty to care for a live fetus resulting from an
abortion may not arise until the fetus has reached the stage of viabili-
ty. 5 5 If this conclusion is reached, the fetus may not appropriately be
analogized to an infant until it has reached the point of viability.
150. COMIUSSION's REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,532
(1975).
151. Id. at 33,548.
152. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1976).
153. See 42 Fed. Reg. 2793 (1977) for the HEW amendment to 45 C.F.R. § 46.209
(1976).
154. See Horan, Fetal Experimentation and Federal Regulation, 22 VILL. L.
REV. 325, 339 (1977).
155. Section 6(1) [of the Missouri statute in question] requires the physi-
cian to exercise the prescribed skill, care, and diligence to preserve the
life and health of the fetus. It does not specify that such care need be
taken only after the stage of viability has been reached. As the provision
now reads, it impermissibly requires the physician to preserve the life
and health of the fetus, whatever the stage of pregnancy.
428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976) (emphasis original).
Consequently, it may be impossible to extend the same protection
from nontherapeutic research to a nonviable fetus as would be ex-
tended to an infant or dying adult.
CONCLUSION
Fetal experimentation involves a conflict between the need for
medical research to improve the quality of fetal care and the rights of
the fetus as the research subject. No solution can be reached that will
satisfy all facets of possible ethical positions. Thus, a compromise is
required between opposing ends of the spectrum.
Individual states have attempted to resolve the ethical dilemma by
proscribing certain types of research. This Comment has focused on
California legislation and has concluded that the present statute has
not satisfactorily effectuated legislative intent and that the state
legislature is not properly equipped to deal with the subtleties pre-
sented by the moral issues involved. Alternatives to legislation on the
state level have been examined. Despite unresolved problems, the
federal regulations based upon recommendations of the National
Commission for the Protection of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search Subjects are currently the most satisfactory means of resolv-
ing medical-ethical dilemmas. It is therefore recommended that the
individual states regulate fetal research by incorporating the federal
regulations into their state codes.5 6
PAULA L. LEHMANN
156. New York has taken a step in this direction. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
2445 (McKinney 1977) (exempts federally regulated research from state regula-
tions).
A model statute would apply the federal regulatory mechanism and its rules
to all research conducted within the state. Because the federal regulations have
not yet been promulgated in all areas of human research, a state should retain
its general, protective legislation, as New York has done, but apply federal
regulations to each type of research for which federal rules have already been
promulgated. For example, a statute might read as follows:
All research on the fetus conducted within this state shall be governed
by the policies and regulations promulgated by any agency of the feder-
al government for the protection of human subjects.
